// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only /* * Landlock - Tracepoint helpers * * Copyright © 2025 Microsoft Corporation * Copyright © 2026 Cloudflare, Inc. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "access.h" #include "domain.h" #include "fs.h" #include "log.h" #include "ruleset.h" #include "trace.h" /* * Generates the tracepoint definitions in this translation unit. The trace * event header dereferences the traced objects in TP_fast_assign, so the full * struct definitions (e.g. ruleset.h, domain.h) must be included before it. */ #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS #include /** * landlock_trace_free_domain - Emit a tracepoint on domain deallocation * * @hierarchy: The domain's hierarchy being deallocated. * * Fires only for a hierarchy whose creation event was emitted, i.e. one that * left LANDLOCK_LOG_UNCOMMITTED in landlock_restrict_self(). This keeps the * create/free pair balanced: a hierarchy that never became observable is freed * silently, while a domain that landlock_restrict_self() created and a * thread-sync failure then aborted still fires free_domain, because its * creation event already fired. * * Called from landlock_log_free_domain(). */ void landlock_trace_free_domain(const struct landlock_hierarchy *const hierarchy) { /* * The log_status read is a correctness guard (keep the create/free pair * balanced), not a cost guard, so this cold path needs no * trace_..._enabled() check: the tracepoint is a static-branch no-op * when disabled. The denial path guards trace_..._enabled() instead * because it does expensive __getname()/path work before emitting. */ if (READ_ONCE(hierarchy->log_status) != LANDLOCK_LOG_UNCOMMITTED) trace_landlock_free_domain(hierarchy); } /** * landlock_trace_denial - Emit a tracepoint for a denied access request * * @request: Detail of the user space request. * @youngest_denied: The youngest hierarchy node that denied the access. * @missing: The set of denied access rights. * @same_exec: Whether the current task is the same executable that called * landlock_restrict_self() for the denying domain, as computed * by landlock_log_denial(). * @logged: Whether the domain's policy selects this denial for logging, as * computed by landlock_log_denial(). * * Emits the tracepoint matching @request->type when its event is enabled. * Unlike audit, fires regardless of @logged; the value is recorded in the event * so consumers can filter on it. * * Called from landlock_log_denial(). */ void landlock_trace_denial( const struct landlock_request *const request, const struct landlock_hierarchy *const youngest_denied, const access_mask_t missing, const bool same_exec, const bool logged) { switch (request->type) { case LANDLOCK_REQUEST_FS_ACCESS: case LANDLOCK_REQUEST_FS_CHANGE_TOPOLOGY: if (trace_landlock_deny_access_fs_enabled()) { char *buf __free(__putname) = __getname(); struct path dentry_path; const char *pathname; const struct path *path = NULL; /* * Selects the path from the audit data type, as * dump_common_audit_data() does. A FS_ACCESS denial * carries a file (hook_file_truncate) or an ioctl op * (hook_file_ioctl) rather than a path; * FS_CHANGE_TOPOLOGY carries a path or a bare dentry. * Reading the wrong union member would dereference * garbage, so every reachable type is handled here. */ switch (request->audit.type) { case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE: path = &request->audit.u.file->f_path; break; case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP: path = &request->audit.u.op->path; break; case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY: /* * Build a path on the stack with the real * dentry so TP_fast_assign can extract dev and * ino; the mnt field is unused there. */ dentry_path = (struct path){ .dentry = request->audit.u.dentry, }; path = &dentry_path; break; case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH: path = &request->audit.u.path; break; default: WARN_ONCE(1, "Unhandled Landlock FS audit type %d", request->audit.type); break; } if (!path) break; if (!buf) { pathname = ""; } else if (request->audit.type == LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY) { /* No vfsmount: render the dentry path alone. */ pathname = dentry_path_raw( request->audit.u.dentry, buf, PATH_MAX); if (IS_ERR(pathname)) pathname = PTR_ERR(pathname) == -ENAMETOOLONG ? "" : ""; } else { pathname = resolve_path_for_trace(path, buf); } trace_landlock_deny_access_fs(youngest_denied, same_exec, logged, missing, path, pathname); } break; case LANDLOCK_REQUEST_NET_ACCESS: if (trace_landlock_deny_access_net_enabled()) trace_landlock_deny_access_net( youngest_denied, same_exec, logged, missing, request->audit.u.net->sk, ntohs(request->audit.u.net->sport), ntohs(request->audit.u.net->dport)); break; case LANDLOCK_REQUEST_PTRACE: if (trace_landlock_deny_ptrace_enabled()) trace_landlock_deny_ptrace(youngest_denied, same_exec, logged, request->other_domain_id, request->audit.u.tsk); break; case LANDLOCK_REQUEST_SCOPE_SIGNAL: if (trace_landlock_deny_scope_signal_enabled()) trace_landlock_deny_scope_signal( youngest_denied, same_exec, logged, request->other_domain_id, request->audit.u.tsk); break; case LANDLOCK_REQUEST_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET: if (trace_landlock_deny_scope_abstract_unix_socket_enabled()) trace_landlock_deny_scope_abstract_unix_socket( youngest_denied, same_exec, logged, request->other_domain_id, request->audit.u.net->sk); break; default: WARN_ONCE(1, "Unhandled Landlock request type %d", request->type); break; } } #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST static void test_trace_seq_init(struct trace_seq *const seq, const size_t size) { memset(seq, 0, sizeof(*seq)); seq_buf_init(&seq->seq, seq->buffer, size); } static void test_untrusted_str_data(struct kunit *const test) { const char binary[] = { 'a', '\0', '<' }; static const char ellipsis[] = "\xe2\x80\xa6"; struct trace_seq *const seq = kunit_kzalloc(test, sizeof(*seq), GFP_KERNEL); const char *output; KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(test, seq); test_trace_seq_init(seq, TRACE_SEQ_BUFFER_SIZE); output = __trace_print_untrusted_str(seq, "", 10); KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(test, output); KUNIT_EXPECT_STREQ(test, output, ""); test_trace_seq_init(seq, TRACE_SEQ_BUFFER_SIZE); output = __trace_print_untrusted_str(seq, binary, sizeof(binary)); KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(test, output); KUNIT_EXPECT_STREQ(test, output, "a\\000<"); /* Input ellipsis bytes are escaped and cannot mimic the raw marker. */ test_trace_seq_init(seq, TRACE_SEQ_BUFFER_SIZE); output = __trace_print_untrusted_str(seq, ellipsis, sizeof(ellipsis) - 1); KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(test, output); KUNIT_EXPECT_STREQ(test, output, "\\342\\200\\246"); } static void test_untrusted_str_boundaries(struct kunit *const test) { static const char escaped_space[] = "\\040"; const size_t output_size = TRACE_UNTRUSTED_STR_OUTPUT_SIZE; const size_t marker_len = sizeof(TRACE_TRUNCATION_MARKER) - 1; const size_t escape_len = sizeof(escaped_space) - 1; const size_t exact_prefix_len = output_size - marker_len - 1 - escape_len; const size_t short_prefix_len = exact_prefix_len + 1; struct trace_seq *const seq = kunit_kzalloc(test, sizeof(*seq), GFP_KERNEL); char *const input = kunit_kmalloc(test, output_size + 1, GFP_KERNEL); char *const expected = kunit_kmalloc(test, output_size, GFP_KERNEL); const char *output; KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(test, seq); KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(test, input); KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(test, expected); /* The escaped string and its trailing NUL exactly fit the limit. */ memset(input, 'a', output_size - 1); test_trace_seq_init(seq, TRACE_SEQ_BUFFER_SIZE); output = __trace_print_untrusted_str(seq, input, output_size - 1); KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(test, output); KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, seq->seq.len, output_size); KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, memcmp(output, input, output_size - 1), 0); /* Stop before a four-byte escape when only three bytes remain. */ memset(input, 'a', short_prefix_len); input[short_prefix_len] = ' '; memset(input + short_prefix_len + 1, 'b', 5); memset(expected, 'a', short_prefix_len); memcpy(expected + short_prefix_len, TRACE_TRUNCATION_MARKER, marker_len + 1); test_trace_seq_init(seq, TRACE_SEQ_BUFFER_SIZE); output = __trace_print_untrusted_str(seq, input, short_prefix_len + 6); KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(test, output); KUNIT_EXPECT_STREQ(test, output, expected); /* Include a four-byte escape that exactly fills the prefix capacity. */ memset(input, 'a', exact_prefix_len); input[exact_prefix_len] = ' '; memset(input + exact_prefix_len + 1, 'b', marker_len + 1); memset(expected, 'a', exact_prefix_len); memcpy(expected + exact_prefix_len, escaped_space, escape_len); memcpy(expected + exact_prefix_len + escape_len, TRACE_TRUNCATION_MARKER, marker_len + 1); test_trace_seq_init(seq, TRACE_SEQ_BUFFER_SIZE); output = __trace_print_untrusted_str(seq, input, exact_prefix_len + marker_len + 2); KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(test, output); KUNIT_EXPECT_STREQ(test, output, expected); /* Literal backslashes remain escaped in complete output. */ test_trace_seq_init(seq, TRACE_SEQ_BUFFER_SIZE); output = __trace_print_untrusted_str(seq, "/\\000", 5); KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(test, output); KUNIT_EXPECT_STREQ(test, output, "/\\\\000"); } static void test_untrusted_str_cursor(struct kunit *const test) { const size_t padding_len = TRACE_SEQ_BUFFER_SIZE - TRACE_UNTRUSTED_STR_OUTPUT_SIZE + 1; struct trace_seq *const seq = kunit_kzalloc(test, sizeof(*seq), GFP_KERNEL); char *const padding = kunit_kzalloc(test, padding_len, GFP_KERNEL); const char *output; KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(test, seq); KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(test, padding); /* Accept available space exactly equal to the fixed reservation. */ test_trace_seq_init(seq, TRACE_SEQ_BUFFER_SIZE); trace_seq_putmem(seq, padding, padding_len - 1); output = __trace_print_untrusted_str(seq, "/a", 2); KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(test, output); KUNIT_EXPECT_STREQ(test, output, "/a"); KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, seq->seq.len, padding_len - 1 + sizeof("/a")); /* Reject one byte less without changing the scratch cursor. */ test_trace_seq_init(seq, TRACE_SEQ_BUFFER_SIZE); trace_seq_putmem(seq, padding, padding_len); output = __trace_print_untrusted_str(seq, "/a", 2); KUNIT_EXPECT_NULL(test, output); KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, seq->seq.len, padding_len); } static void test_untrusted_str_composition(struct kunit *const test) { static const struct trace_print_flags flags[] = { { .mask = 1, .name = "read" }, }; const size_t output_size = TRACE_UNTRUSTED_STR_OUTPUT_SIZE; const size_t prefix_len = output_size - sizeof(TRACE_TRUNCATION_MARKER); struct trace_seq *const seq = kunit_kzalloc(test, sizeof(*seq), GFP_KERNEL); char *const expected = kunit_kmalloc(test, output_size, GFP_KERNEL); char *const path = kunit_kmalloc(test, output_size, GFP_KERNEL); const char *flags_output, *path_output; KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(test, seq); KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(test, expected); KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(test, path); memset(path, 'a', output_size); memset(expected, 'a', prefix_len); memcpy(expected + prefix_len, TRACE_TRUNCATION_MARKER, sizeof(TRACE_TRUNCATION_MARKER)); /* Exercise both legal TP_printk() sibling evaluation orders. */ test_trace_seq_init(seq, TRACE_SEQ_BUFFER_SIZE); path_output = __trace_print_untrusted_str(seq, path, output_size); flags_output = trace_print_flags_seq(seq, "|", 1, flags, ARRAY_SIZE(flags)); KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(test, path_output); KUNIT_EXPECT_STREQ(test, path_output, expected); KUNIT_EXPECT_STREQ(test, flags_output, "read"); test_trace_seq_init(seq, TRACE_SEQ_BUFFER_SIZE); flags_output = trace_print_flags_seq(seq, "|", 1, flags, ARRAY_SIZE(flags)); path_output = __trace_print_untrusted_str(seq, path, output_size); KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(test, path_output); KUNIT_EXPECT_STREQ(test, path_output, expected); KUNIT_EXPECT_STREQ(test, flags_output, "read"); } static struct kunit_case test_cases[] = { /* clang-format off */ KUNIT_CASE(test_untrusted_str_data), KUNIT_CASE(test_untrusted_str_boundaries), KUNIT_CASE(test_untrusted_str_cursor), KUNIT_CASE(test_untrusted_str_composition), {} /* clang-format on */ }; static struct kunit_suite test_suite = { .name = "landlock_trace", .test_cases = test_cases, }; kunit_test_suite(test_suite); #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST */