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'vfs/vfs-7.2.directory.delegations' and 'vfs/vfs-7.2.exportfs' into vfs-7.2-merge
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Replace %ld with %pe and PTR_ERR(path) with path pointer.
The %pe specifier automatically converts error pointers to
human-readable error names instead of raw error codes.
These changes were found by coccicheck.
Signed-off-by: Abdellah Ouhbi <abdououhbi1@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260424154307.169881-1-abdououhbi1@gmail.com
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260424155508.186235-1-abdououhbi1@gmail.com
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260424152245.142308-1-abdououhbi1@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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In EXT4_GOING_FLAGS_LOGFLUSH mode, the EXT4_FLAGS_SHUTDOWN flag was set
before calling ext4_force_commit(). This caused ordered-mode data
writeback (triggered by journal commit) to fail with -EIO, since
ext4_do_writepages() checks for the shutdown flag. The journal would
then be aborted prematurely before the commit could succeed.
Fix this by calling ext4_force_commit() first, then setting the
shutdown flag, so that pending data can be written back correctly.
Note that moving ext4_force_commit() before setting the shutdown flag
creates a small window in which new writes may occur and generate new
journal transactions. When the journal is subsequently aborted, the
new transactions will not be able to write to disk. This is intentional
because LOGFLUSH's semantics are to flush pre-existing journal entries
before shutdown, not to guarantee atomicity for writes that race with
the ioctl.
Fixes: 783d94854499 ("ext4: add EXT4_IOC_GOINGDOWN ioctl")
Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Baokun Li <libaokun@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260424104201.1930823-1-yi.zhang@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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Replace KUnit tests for memcmp() with KUNIT_ASSERT_MEMEQ() to improve
debugging that prints the hex dump of the buffers when the assertion fails,
whereas memcmp() only returns an integer difference.
Signed-off-by: Ryota Sakamoto <sakamo.ryota@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260127-fix-fs_ext4-memcmp-v1-1-5c269ae906b6@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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DAX support in ext2 was deprecated in commit d5a2693f93e4 ("ext2:
Deprecate DAX") with a removal deadline of end of 2025. Remove all DAX
code from ext2 as scheduled.
This removes the DAX mount option, IOMAP DAX support, DAX file
operations, DAX address_space_operations, and the DAX fault handler.
[JK: Fixup some whitespace damage]
Signed-off-by: Ashwin Gundarapu <linuxuser509@zohomail.in>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/19e5aa07c9b.3a2e576d130187.5289857983023045470@zohomail.in
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
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A deferred byte-range lock (an SMB2_LOCK that blocks) registers an async work on
conn->async_requests via setup_async_work(), with cancel_fn =
smb2_remove_blocked_lock and cancel_argv[0] pointing at the struct file_lock.
When the request is cancelled, the worker frees the file_lock with
locks_free_lock() and takes the cancelled early-exit, which "goto out"s and never
reaches release_async_work() -- the only site that unlinks the work from
conn->async_requests and clears cancel_fn/cancel_argv. The work therefore stays
matchable on async_requests with a live cancel_fn pointing at the freed file_lock,
until connection teardown finally runs release_async_work().
smb2_cancel() fires cancel_fn unconditionally with no state guard, so a second
SMB2_CANCEL for the same AsyncId, arriving in that window, re-runs
smb2_remove_blocked_lock() on the freed file_lock -- a slab use-after-free:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __locks_delete_block
__locks_delete_block
locks_delete_block
ksmbd_vfs_posix_lock_unblock
smb2_remove_blocked_lock
smb2_cancel <- 2nd SMB2_CANCEL fires cancel_fn
handle_ksmbd_work
Allocated by ...: locks_alloc_lock <- smb2_lock
Freed by ...: locks_free_lock <- smb2_lock (cancelled branch)
... cache file_lock_cache of size 192
Reproduced on mainline with KASAN by an authenticated SMB client.
Skip a work whose state is already KSMBD_WORK_CANCELLED so its cancel callback
cannot be fired a second time.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gil Portnoy <dddhkts1@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
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Two concurrent same-user DHnC reconnects can both observe fp->conn == NULL
before either sets it. ksmbd_reopen_durable_fd() checks fp->conn to guard
against a handle already being reconnected, but the check and the binding
assignment are not atomic: both threads pass the guard, both call
ksmbd_conn_get() on the same fp, and both eventually reach
kfree(fp->owner.name) -- a double-free of the owner.name slab object.
The double-bound ksmbd_file also causes a write-UAF on the 344-byte
ksmbd_file_cache object when a concurrent smb2_close() spins on fp->f_lock
after the object has been freed by the losing reconnect path.
KASAN on 7.1-rc5 (48-thread concurrent reconnect, 3000 cycles):
BUG: KASAN: double-free in ksmbd_reopen_durable_fd+0x268/0x308
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock+0xac/0x150
Write of size 4 at offset 24 into freed ksmbd_file_cache object
Five double-bind windows observed; 63 total KASAN reports triggered.
Fix: validate and claim fp->conn under write_lock(&global_ft.lock) so the
check-and-claim is atomic. ksmbd_lookup_durable_fd() already treats
fp->conn != NULL as "in use" and skips such an fp; setting fp->conn before
dropping the lock closes the race. ksmbd_conn_get() is a non-sleeping
refcount increment, safe under the rwlock. The rollback path on __open_id()
failure also clears fp->conn/tcon under the lock so concurrent readers see
a consistent state.
Fixes: b1f1e80620de ("ksmbd: centralize ksmbd_conn final release to plug transport leak")
Assisted-by: Henry (Claude):claude-opus-4
Signed-off-by: Gil Portnoy <dddhkts1@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
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smb2_oplock_break_noti() and smb2_lease_break_noti() read opinfo->conn
into a local with neither READ_ONCE() nor a NULL check. Both run from
oplock_break() after opinfo_get_list() has dropped ci->m_lock, so a
concurrent SMB2 LOGOFF (session_fd_check()) can set op->conn = NULL
under ci->m_lock within that window. ksmbd_conn_r_count_inc(conn) then
writes through NULL at offset 0xc4 -- a remotely triggerable oops.
Guard both reads the way compare_guid_key() already does: read
opinfo->conn with READ_ONCE() and return early if it is NULL, before
allocating the work struct so nothing leaks. A NULL conn means the
client is gone and the break is moot, so return 0; oplock_break() treats
that as success and runs the normal teardown.
Fixes: c8efcc786146 ("ksmbd: add support for durable handles v1/v2")
Assisted-by: Henry (Claude):claude-opus-4
Signed-off-by: Gil Portnoy <dddhkts1@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
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Pull smb client fixes from Steve French:
- fix uninitialized variable in smb2_writev_callback()
- detect short folioq copy in cifs_copy_folioq_to_iter()
* tag 'v7.1-rc6-smb3-client-fixes' of git://git.samba.org/sfrench/cifs-2.6:
smb: client: fix uninitialized variable in smb2_writev_callback
smb: client: detect short folioq copy in cifs_copy_folioq_to_iter()
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Update a comment to refer to folios instead of pages.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
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xfs_mountfs currently ignores all errors from xfs_fs_reserve_ag_blocks,
which can lead to the mount path continuing on corruption errors.
Fix the check to only ignore -ENOSPC as in other callers, and unwind for
all other errors.
Fixes: 81ed94751b15 ("xfs: fix log intent recovery ENOSPC shutdowns when inactivating inodes")
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
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Sticks out a bit better if we add a separate helper for it.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Wilfred Mallawa <wilfred.mallawa@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
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Keep the rtgroup reference until after reporting the write pointer, as
that uses it. Right now this is not a major issue as we don't support
shrinking file systems in a way that makes RTGs go away, but let's stick
to the proper reference counting to prepare for that.
Fixes: c6ce65cb17aa ("xfs: add write pointer to xfs_rtgroup_geometry")
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Wilfred Mallawa <wilfred.mallawa@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
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xrep_cow_find_bad_rt() initializes scrub rtgroup state before the
force-rebuild path calls xrep_cow_mark_file_range(). If that call
fails, the code jumps directly to out_rtg, which skips the scrub
rtgroup cleanup and only drops the local rtgroup reference.
Remove the unnecessary jump so the function falls through to out_sr,
ensuring the realtime cursors, lock state, and sr->rtg reference are
released before returning.
Fixes: fd97fe111208 ("xfs: fix CoW forks for realtime files")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.14
Signed-off-by: Yingjie Gao <gaoyingjie@uniontech.com>
Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
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xrep_cow_find_bad() returns success after the cleanup labels even if
AG setup, btree queries, or bitmap updates failed. This can make
repair continue with an incomplete bad-file-offset bitmap instead of
stopping at the original error.
The force-rebuild path has a related cleanup problem. If
xrep_cow_mark_file_range() fails, the function returns directly and
skips the scrub AG context and perag cleanup.
Let the force-rebuild path fall through to the existing cleanup code
and return the saved error after cleanup.
Fixes: dbbdbd008632 ("xfs: repair problems in CoW forks")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.8
Signed-off-by: Yingjie Gao <gaoyingjie@uniontech.com>
Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
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xfs_fs_map_blocks() currently passes XFS_BMAPI_ENTIRE to xfs_bmapi_read(),
which causes the bmap code to expand the mapping to cover the entire
extent rather than the requested range.
A single LAYOUTGET request from the client can cause the server to
issue multiple calls to xfs_fs_map_blocks() for different offsets
within the same extent. Because the use of XFS_BMAPI_ENTIRE flag,
these calls can produce overlapping mappings.
As a result, the LAYOUTGET reply sent to the NFS client may contain
overlapping extents. This creates ambiguity in extent selection for a
given file range, which can lead to incorrect device selection,
inconsistent handling of datastate, and ultimately data corruption or
protocol violations on the client side.
Problem discovered with xfstest generic/075 test using NFSv4.2 mount
with SCSI layout.
Fix this by replacing the XFS_BMAPI_ENTIRE flag with '0' so that
xfs_bmapi_read() returns only the mapping for the requested range.
Fixes: cc6c40e09d7b1 ("NFSD/blocklayout: Support multiple extents per LAYOUTGET").
Signed-off-by: Dai Ngo <dai.ngo@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
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xfs_fs_map_blocks() acquires the data map lock and then calls
xfs_bmapi_read(). If xfs_bmapi_read() fails, the function currently
still falls through to xfs_bmbt_to_iomap(), which consumes an
uninitialized imap record and may return invalid data to the caller.
Fix this by releasing the data map lock and returning immediately when
xfs_bmapi_read() reports an error. This prevents xfs_bmbt_to_iomap()
from being called with an uninitialized xfs_bmbt_irec.
Fixes: 527851124d10f ("xfs: implement pNFS export operations")
Signed-off-by: Dai Ngo <dai.ngo@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
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Under heavy garbage collection pressure from RocksDB workloads,
filesystem shutdowns can occur in xfs_zone_gc_iter_irec when
xfs_iget() returns -EINVAL for deleted files.
Fix this by handling -EINVAL just like we handle -ENOENT, allowing
zone GC to safely ignore stale mappings.
Fixes: 080d01c41d44 ("xfs: implement zoned garbage collection")
Signed-off-by: Hans Holmberg <hans.holmberg@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
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Pull smb server fixes from Steve French:
- security fix for FSCTL_SET_SPARSE
- fix leak in ksmbd_query_inode_status()
- fix OOB read in smb_check_perm_dacl()
* tag 'v7.1-rc6-ksmbd-server-fixes' of git://git.samba.org/ksmbd:
ksmbd: fix FSCTL permission bypass by adding a permission check for FSCTL_SET_SPARSE
ksmbd: release ksmbd_inode ref via ksmbd_inode_put on lookup paths
ksmbd: OOB read regression in smb_check_perm_dacl() ACE-walk loops
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Processes can write to the last page of a file using mmap, and when the file
size is not a multiple of the page size, this can be used to write beyond the
end of the file. This is sometimes referred to as page poisoning, and it is
not a problem in itself because the data beyond eof will be ignored. However,
we currently fail to clear out any space beyond the end of the file that we
skip over when the file size is increased, so that "poison" can end up getting
exposed. Fix that.
Fixes xfstest generic/363.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
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The mode argument of fallocate_chunk() became unused in commit
1885867b84d5 ("GFS2: Update i_size properly on fallocate"), so remove it.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
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Several functions in namei.c take an "int *type" parameter, such as
filename_parentat(). To know what values this can take you have to find
the anonymous struct that defines the LAST_XXX values. Define an enum
last_type to make this type explicit.
Signed-off-by: Jori Koolstra <jkoolstra@xs4all.nl>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260528175854.57626-2-jkoolstra@xs4all.nl
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
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The only user of LAST_XXX outside of fs/namei.c is fs/smb/server/vfs.c;
ksmbd_vfs_path_lookup() calls vfs_path_parent_lookup() and expects a
LAST_NORM last type (or it will be ENOENT). ksmbd_vfs_rename() also calls
vfs_path_parent_lookup() but forgets the LAST_NORM check.
It does not really make sense to have vfs_path_parent_lookup() expose
the last_type because it is only needed to ensure it is LAST_NORM. So
let's do this check in vfs_path_parent_lookup() instead and keep the
LAST_XXX internal to fs/namei.c. This changes the ENOENT errno in
ksmbd_vfs_path_lookup() to EINVAL, which matches better with how this is
handled by callers of filename_parentat().
Signed-off-by: Jori Koolstra <jkoolstra@xs4all.nl>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260528175854.57626-1-jkoolstra@xs4all.nl
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <neil@brown.name>
Reviewed-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
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z_erofs_decompress_kickoff() can race with filesystem unmount, causing
a use-after-free on sbi->sync_decompress.
When I/O completes, z_erofs_endio() calls z_erofs_decompress_kickoff()
to queue z_erofs_decompressqueue_work() asynchronously. Then, after all
folios are unlocked, unmount workflow can proceed and sbi will be freed
before accessing to sbi->sync_decompress.
Thread (unmount) I/O completion kworker
queue_work
z_erofs_decompressqueue_work
(all folios are unlocked)
cleanup_mnt
..
erofs_kill_sb
erofs_sb_free
kfree(sbi)
access sbi->sync_decompress // UAF!!
Fixes: 40452ffca3c1 ("erofs: add sysfs node to control sync decompression strategy")
Reported-by: syzbot+52bae5c495dbe261a0bc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=52bae5c495dbe261a0bc
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jianan Huang <jnhuang95@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang <hsiangkao@linux.alibaba.com>
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On a volume mounted without OCFS2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_SPARSE_ALLOC, a
non-inline regular file with non-zero i_size and zero i_clusters is
structurally malformed: the extent map declares no allocated clusters yet
the size header claims content exists. Keep rejecting that shape, but
express it through a shared predicate so the same invariant is available
to normal inode reads and online filecheck.
The same zero-cluster shape is also malformed for non-inline directories.
ocfs2 directory growth allocates backing storage before advancing i_size,
and ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_el() later walks until ctx->pos reaches
i_size_read(inode). A forged directory dinode with a huge i_size and no
clusters would repeatedly fail on holes while advancing through the
claimed size.
Sparse regular files remain exempt: on sparse-alloc volumes, truncate can
legitimately grow i_size without allocating clusters. System inodes and
inline-data dinodes also retain their separate storage rules.
Mirror the check in ocfs2_filecheck_validate_inode_block() as well.
filecheck reports through its own error namespace, so malformed
size/cluster state is logged as a filecheck invalid-inode result rather
than via ocfs2_error(), but it must not proceed into
ocfs2_populate_inode().
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260519110404.1803902-4-michael.bommarito@gmail.com
Fixes: b657c95c1108 ("ocfs2: Wrap inode block reads in a dedicated function.")
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260517111015.3187935-1-michael.bommarito%40gmail.com
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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id1.dev1.i_rdev is the device-number arm of the ocfs2_dinode id1 union.
It is only meaningful for character and block device inodes. For any
other user-visible file type the on-disk value must be zero.
ocfs2_populate_inode() currently copies id1.dev1.i_rdev into inode->i_rdev
before the S_IFMT switch decides whether the inode is a special file. A
non-device inode with a non-zero i_rdev can therefore publish stale or
attacker-controlled device state into the in-core inode.
System inodes legitimately use other arms of the same union, so keep the
cross-check restricted to non-system inodes. Factor that predicate into a
helper and use it in both the normal validator and online filecheck path;
filecheck reports the malformed dinode through
OCFS2_FILECHECK_ERR_INVALIDINO instead of ocfs2_error().
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260519110404.1803902-3-michael.bommarito@gmail.com
Fixes: b657c95c1108 ("ocfs2: Wrap inode block reads in a dedicated function.")
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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Patch series "ocfs2: harden inode validators against forged metadata", v2.
This series adds three structural checks to OCFS2 dinode validation so
malformed on-disk fields are rejected before ocfs2_populate_inode() copies
them into the in-core inode.
The checks cover:
- i_mode values whose type bits do not name a canonical POSIX file
type;
- non-device dinodes whose id1.dev1.i_rdev field is non-zero; and
- non-inline dinodes that claim non-zero i_size while i_clusters is
zero, covering directories unconditionally and regular files on
non-sparse volumes.
The normal read path reports these through ocfs2_error(), matching the
existing suballoc-slot, inline-data, chain-list, and refcount checks. The
online filecheck path uses the same structural predicates but keeps its
own reporting contract, returning OCFS2_FILECHECK_ERR_INVALIDINO instead
of calling ocfs2_error().
This patch (of 3):
ocfs2_validate_inode_block() currently accepts any non-zero i_mode value.
ocfs2_populate_inode() then copies that mode verbatim into inode->i_mode
and dispatches on i_mode & S_IFMT to the file/dir/symlink/special_file
iops; an unrecognised type falls through to ocfs2_special_file_iops and
init_special_inode().
Reject dinodes whose type bits do not name one of the seven canonical
POSIX file types. Use fs_umode_to_ftype(), the same generic file-type
conversion helper OCFS2 already uses for directory entries, so the
accepted inode type set matches the kernel file-type vocabulary instead of
open-coding a local switch.
Apply the same structural check to the online filecheck read path.
filecheck keeps its own error namespace, so it reports malformed i_mode
through the filecheck logger and OCFS2_FILECHECK_ERR_INVALIDINO instead of
calling ocfs2_error(), but it must not allow a malformed dinode to proceed
into ocfs2_populate_inode().
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260519110404.1803902-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260519110404.1803902-2-michael.bommarito@gmail.com
Fixes: b657c95c1108 ("ocfs2: Wrap inode block reads in a dedicated function.")
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260517111015.3187935-1-michael.bommarito%40gmail.com
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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Commit 43b10a20372d ("ocfs2: avoid system inode ref confusion by adding
mutex lock") tried to avoid a refcount leak caused by allowing multiple
threads to call igrab(inode). But addition of osb->system_file_mutex made
locking dependency complicated and is causing lockdep to warn about
possibility of AB-BA deadlock.
Since _ocfs2_get_system_file_inode() returns the same inode for the same
input arguments, we don't need to serialize
_ocfs2_get_system_file_inode(). What we need to make sure is that
igrab(inode) is called for only once(). Therefore, replace
osb->system_file_mutex with cmpxchg()-based locking.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/fea8d1fd-afb0-4302-a560-c202e2ef7afd@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
Fixes: 43b10a20372d ("ocfs2: avoid system inode ref confusion by adding mutex lock")
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reviewed-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Acked-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Stop directly calling into function pointers from users of the RAID6 PQ
API, and provide exported functions with proper documentation and API
guarantees asserts where applicable instead.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260518051804.462141-8-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> # kunit only on arm64
Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Alexandre Ghiti <alex@ghiti.fr>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Li Nan <linan122@huawei.com>
Cc: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
Cc: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: WANG Xuerui <kernel@xen0n.name>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
[BUG]
A corrupt inline xattr header can make ocfs2_reflink_xattr_inline() lock,
copy, and reflink xattr state from an unchecked ibody xattr header.
[CAUSE]
The inline reflink path still trusted di->i_xattr_inline_size to compute
header_off, xh, and new_xh before handing the source header to the reflink
allocator and copy logic.
[FIX]
Validate the source inode's inline xattr header with the shared helper
first, then derive the reflink copy offsets from the validated inline
size/header. This keeps the reflink path from traversing corrupt ibody
xattr geometry.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260508085914.61647-6-gality369@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: ZhengYuan Huang <gality369@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Cc: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Zixuan Fu <r33s3n6@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
[BUG]
A corrupt inline xattr header can make ocfs2_xattr_inline_attach_refcount()
feed an unchecked header into the refcount-attachment walk for inline
xattr values.
[CAUSE]
The inline refcount-attach path still derived the header directly from
di->i_xattr_inline_size and then passed it to code that iterates xh_count
and xattr entries.
[FIX]
Use the shared ibody header helper before attaching refcounts to inline
xattr values so corrupt header geometry is rejected with -EFSCORRUPTED
instead of being traversed.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260508085914.61647-5-gality369@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: ZhengYuan Huang <gality369@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Cc: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Zixuan Fu <r33s3n6@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
[BUG]
A corrupt inline xattr header can make ocfs2_xattr_ibody_remove() pass an
unchecked header into ocfs2_remove_value_outside() during inode xattr
teardown.
[CAUSE]
ocfs2_xattr_ibody_remove() still rebuilt the ibody xattr header directly
from di->i_xattr_inline_size and then handed it to code that iterates
xh_count and entry geometry.
[FIX]
Validate the inline xattr header with the shared helper before handing it
to the outside-value removal path, and propagate -EFSCORRUPTED on bad
metadata instead of traversing the unchecked header.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260508085914.61647-4-gality369@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: ZhengYuan Huang <gality369@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Cc: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Zixuan Fu <r33s3n6@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
[BUG]
A corrupt inline xattr header can make
ocfs2_has_inline_xattr_value_outside() walk xh_count from an unchecked
header while refcount-tree teardown decides whether inline xattrs still
point outside the inode body.
[CAUSE]
ocfs2_has_inline_xattr_value_outside() still computed the inline header
directly from di->i_xattr_inline_size and immediately iterated xh_count.
That is the same unchecked metadata boundary as the ibody lookup bug.
[FIX]
Reuse the shared inline-header helper before iterating xh_count. Because
this helper returns a boolean-style answer to its caller, treat a corrupt
header conservatively as "has outside values" instead of walking it.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260508085914.61647-3-gality369@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: ZhengYuan Huang <gality369@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Cc: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Zixuan Fu <r33s3n6@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Patch series "ocfs2: validate inline xattr header consumers".
Corrupt i_xattr_inline_size can move the computed inode-body xattr header
outside the dinode block. Several OCFS2 paths then trust xh_count or
xattr entry geometry from that unchecked header.
The reported KASAN splat hits the ibody lookup path:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ocfs2_xattr_find_entry+0x37b/0x3a0
ocfs2_xattr_ibody_get()
ocfs2_xattr_get_nolock()
ocfs2_calc_xattr_init()
The same unchecked header derivation also exists in the outside-value
probe, ibody remove, inline refcount attach, and inline reflink paths.
This series factors the existing ibody list validation into a shared
helper and then converts the remaining inline-header consumers one at a
time.
Patch layout:
1. validate ibody get/find and reuse the helper in ibody list
2. validate the outside-value probe
3. validate ibody remove
4. validate inline refcount attach
5. validate inline reflink
This patch (of 5):
[BUG]
mknodat() can read past the end of a dinode block when ACL inheritance
walks a corrupted inode-body xattr header. Another report shows the same
unchecked lookup later faulting in the VFS open path after create
returns a garbage status.
KASAN: use-after-free in
ocfs2_xattr_find_entry+0x37b/0x3a0 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:1078
Read of size 2 at addr ffff88801c520300 by task syz.0.10/360
Trace:
...
ocfs2_xattr_find_entry+0x37b/0x3a0 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:1078
ocfs2_xattr_ibody_get fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:1178 [inline]
ocfs2_xattr_get_nolock+0x2ee/0x1110 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:1309
ocfs2_calc_xattr_init+0x716/0xac0 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:628
ocfs2_mknod+0x935/0x2400 fs/ocfs2/namei.c:333
ocfs2_create+0x158/0x390 fs/ocfs2/namei.c:676
vfs_create fs/namei.c:3493 [inline]
vfs_create+0x445/0x6f0 fs/namei.c:3477
do_mknodat+0x2d8/0x5e0 fs/namei.c:4372
__do_sys_mknodat fs/namei.c:4400 [inline]
__se_sys_mknodat fs/namei.c:4397 [inline]
__x64_sys_mknodat+0xb6/0xf0 fs/namei.c:4397
...
Another report:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff3e40ec0
RIP: 0010:__d_entry_type include/linux/dcache.h:414 [inline]
RIP: 0010:d_can_lookup include/linux/dcache.h:429 [inline]
RIP: 0010:d_is_dir include/linux/dcache.h:439 [inline]
RIP: 0010:path_openat+0xe2f/0x2ce0 fs/namei.c:4134
Trace:
...
do_filp_open+0x1f6/0x430 fs/namei.c:4161
do_sys_openat2+0x117/0x1c0 fs/open.c:1437
__x64_sys_openat+0x15b/0x220 fs/open.c:1463
...
[CAUSE]
ocfs2_xattr_ibody_list() already validates the inline xattr size and
entry count, but ocfs2_xattr_ibody_get() and ocfs2_xattr_ibody_find()
still derive the inline header directly from di->i_xattr_inline_size and
then trust xh_count. A corrupted inline size or entry count can therefore
move the computed header outside the dinode block before get/find start
walking it. That can either make ocfs2_xattr_find_entry() dereference
xs->header->xh_count outside the block or make ocfs2_xattr_get_nolock()
bubble a garbage status back through ocfs2_calc_xattr_init() into the
create/open path.
[FIX]
Factor the existing ibody header geometry checks into a shared helper.
Use it in ocfs2_xattr_ibody_get() and ocfs2_xattr_ibody_find(), and have
ocfs2_xattr_ibody_list() reuse the same helper instead of open-coding
the validation. Reject corrupt ibody metadata with -EFSCORRUPTED before
the lookup path can walk bogus xattr geometry or return a garbage status.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260508085914.61647-1-gality369@gmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260508085914.61647-2-gality369@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: ZhengYuan Huang <gality369@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>
Cc: Zixuan Fu <r33s3n6@gmail.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
[BUG]
A fuzzed OCFS2 image can corrupt the current slot journal dinode while
mount is still in progress. The mount path first reports the invalid
journal block and then crashes in shutdown:
kernel BUG at fs/ocfs2/journal.c:1034!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
RIP: 0010:ocfs2_journal_toggle_dirty+0x2d6/0x340 fs/ocfs2/journal.c:1034
Call Trace:
ocfs2_journal_shutdown+0x414/0xc30 fs/ocfs2/journal.c:1116
ocfs2_mount_volume fs/ocfs2/super.c:1785 [inline]
ocfs2_fill_super+0x30a9/0x3cd0 fs/ocfs2/super.c:1083
get_tree_bdev_flags+0x38b/0x640 fs/super.c:1698
get_tree_bdev+0x24/0x40 fs/super.c:1721
ocfs2_get_tree+0x21/0x30 fs/ocfs2/super.c:1184
vfs_get_tree+0x9a/0x370 fs/super.c:1758
fc_mount fs/namespace.c:1199 [inline]
do_new_mount_fc fs/namespace.c:3642 [inline]
do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3718 [inline]
path_mount+0x5b8/0x1ea0 fs/namespace.c:4028
do_mount fs/namespace.c:4041 [inline]
__do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4229 [inline]
__se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4206 [inline]
__x64_sys_mount+0x282/0x320 fs/namespace.c:4206
...
[CAUSE]
ocfs2_journal_toggle_dirty() used to return -EIO when journal->j_bh no
longer contained a valid dinode, because the startup and shutdown paths
already handled that failure. Commit 10995aa2451a
("ocfs2: Morph the haphazard OCFS2_IS_VALID_DINODE() checks.") changed
the check to a BUG_ON() under the assumption that the journal dinode had
already been validated. That turns an unexpected invalid journal dinode
during mount teardown into a kernel crash instead of a normal mount
failure.
[FIX]
Replace the BUG_ON() with WARN_ON() and return -EIO. This keeps the
invariant warning for debugging, but restores the original behavior of
failing startup or shutdown cleanly instead of panicking the kernel.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260512024115.4036371-1-gality369@gmail.com
Fixes: 10995aa2451a ("ocfs2: Morph the haphazard OCFS2_IS_VALID_DINODE() checks.")
Signed-off-by: ZhengYuan Huang <gality369@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
[BUG]
openat(..., O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC) can hit:
kernel BUG at fs/ocfs2/file.c:454!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
RIP: 0010:ocfs2_truncate_file+0x1204/0x13c0 fs/ocfs2/file.c:454
Call Trace:
ocfs2_setattr+0xa6d/0x1fd0 fs/ocfs2/file.c:1212
notify_change+0x4b5/0x1030 fs/attr.c:546
do_truncate+0x1d2/0x230 fs/open.c:68
handle_truncate fs/namei.c:3596 [inline]
do_open fs/namei.c:3979 [inline]
path_openat+0x260f/0x2ce0 fs/namei.c:4134
do_filp_open+0x1f6/0x430 fs/namei.c:4161
do_sys_openat2+0x117/0x1c0 fs/open.c:1437
do_sys_open fs/open.c:1452 [inline]
__do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1468 [inline]
__se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1463 [inline]
__x64_sys_openat+0x15b/0x220 fs/open.c:1463
...
[CAUSE]
ocfs2_truncate_file() treats di_bh->i_size matching inode->i_size as an
internal code invariant and BUGs if it is broken.
That assumption is too strong for corrupted metadata. The dinode block can
still be structurally valid enough to pass ocfs2_read_inode_block() while
no longer matching an already-instantiated VFS inode. On local mounts,
ocfs2_inode_lock_update() skips refresh entirely, so truncate can
observe the mismatch directly and crash instead of rejecting the
corruption.
[FIX]
Turn the BUG_ON into normal OCFS2 corruption handling. If truncate sees
di_bh->i_size disagree with inode->i_size, report it with ocfs2_error() and
abort before touching truncate state.
This keeps the fix at the first boundary that actually requires the
sizes to match and avoids widening checks into hotter generic
inode-lock paths
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260512021601.3936417-1-gality369@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: ZhengYuan Huang <gality369@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Clean up inconsistent indentation (mixing tabs and spaces) and remove
extraneous whitespace in several Kconfig files across the tree. This is a
purely cosmetic change to improve readability.
Adjust indentation from spaces to tab (+optional two spaces) as in
coding style with command like:
$ sed -e 's/^ /\t/' -i */Kconfig
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260407053945.14116-1-linux.amoon@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Anand Moon <linux.amoon@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> [fs]
Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com> [mm]
Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <ljs@kernel.org> [mm]
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Add KUnit coverage for fat_clus_to_blknr() and fat_get_blknr_offset()
using stub msdos_sb_info values so cluster-to-sector and i_pos split math
stays correct.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260405011920.28622-1-adinata.softwareengineer@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Adi Nata <adinata.softwareengineer@gmail.com>
Acked-by: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
ocfs2 quota recovery allocates a bitmap buffer with kmalloc and does not
fully initialize it. This can lead to use of uninitialized bits during
quota recovery from a corrupted filesystem image.
Use kzalloc instead to ensure the bitmap is zero-initialized.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260418131048.1052507-1-tristmd@gmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+7ea0b96c4ddb49fd1a70@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Tristan Madani <tristan@talencesecurity.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Replace strlen(fn) with strnlen(fn, NAME_MAX + 1) when validating the
final path component in __proc_create().
This preserves the existing name limit while bounding the length scan to
one byte past the maximum name length. Handle empty names separately, and
treat names longer than NAME_MAX as too long.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260421122648.56723-2-thorsten.blum@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
Cc: wangzijie <wangzijie1@honor.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
* deduplicate "iter.tgid += 1" line,
Right now it is done once inside next_tgid() itself and second time
inside "for" loop.
* deduplicate next_tgid() call itself with different loop style:
auto it = make_tgid_iter();
while (next_tgid(&it)) {
...
}
gcc seems to inline it twice:
$ ./scripts/bloat-o-meter ../vmlinux-000 ../obj/vmlinux
add/remove: 0/1 grow/shrink: 1/0 up/down: 100/-245 (-145)
Function old new delta
proc_pid_readdir 531 631 +100
next_tgid 245 - -245
* make tgid_iter.pid_ns const
it never changes during readdir anyway
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove newline]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260422191745.435556-2-adobriyan@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
next_tgid() accepts pid namespace as an argument, but it never changes
during readdir (which would be unthinkable thing to do anyway).
Move it inside iterator type and hide from direct usage.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260422191745.435556-1-adobriyan@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Return the result of calling fanotify_fsid_equal() directly to simplify
the code.
Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260527142233.1256340-3-thorsten.blum@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
|
|
A SOFTIRQ-safe to SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order deadlock can occur in
send_sigio() and send_sigurg() when a process group receives a signal.
When FASYNC is configured for a process group (PIDTYPE_PGID), both
functions use read_lock(&tasklist_lock) to traverse the task list.
However, they are frequently called from softirq context:
- send_sigio() via input_inject_event -> kill_fasync
- send_sigurg() via tcp_check_urg -> sk_send_sigurg (NET_RX_SOFTIRQ)
The deadlock is caused by the rwlock writer fairness mechanism:
1. CPU 0 (process context) holds read_lock(&tasklist_lock) in do_wait().
2. CPU 1 (process context) attempts write_lock(&tasklist_lock) in
fork() or exit() and spins, which blocks all new readers.
3. CPU 0 is interrupted by a softirq (e.g., TCP URG packet reception).
4. The softirq calls send_sigurg() and attempts to acquire
read_lock(&tasklist_lock), deadlocking because CPU 1 is waiting.
Since PID hashing and do_each_pid_task() traversals are already
RCU-protected, the read_lock on tasklist_lock is no longer strictly
required for safe traversal. Fix this by replacing tasklist_lock with
rcu_read_lock(), aligning the process group signaling path with the
single-PID path. This also mitigates a potential remote denial of
service vector via TCP URG packets.
Lockdep splat:
=====================================================
WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected
[...]
Chain exists of:
&dev->event_lock --> &f_owner->lock --> tasklist_lock
Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(tasklist_lock);
local_irq_disable();
lock(&dev->event_lock);
lock(&f_owner->lock);
<Interrupt>
lock(&dev->event_lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mingyu Wang <25181214217@stu.xidian.edu.cn>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260523135210.590928-1-w15303746062@163.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
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anon_pipe_write() takes pipe->mutex (aka "mutex protecting the whole
thing") and then, from the per-iteration anon_pipe_get_page() helper,
used to call alloc_page(GFP_HIGHUSER | __GFP_ACCOUNT) once per page
while still holding it.
That allocation can sleep doing direct reclaim and/or runs memcg
charging, which extends the critical section and stalls a concurrent
reader on the very same mutex.
Just pre-alloc the required pages before the lock in an array and just pop
them inside the lock.
This can improve the pipe throughput up to 48% and reduce the
latency in 33%, easily seen when there is memory pressure and direct
reclaim.
Reviewed-by: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260524-fix_pipe-v3-1-bb4a75d23a90@debian.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
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The routine originally showed up in e9a53aeb5e0a838f ("file: Implement
task_lookup_next_fd_rcu"), afterwards it got renamed and started
entering RCU on its own in 8fd3395ec9051a52 ("get rid of
...lookup...fdget_rcu() family").
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260522142152.1515572-1-mjguzik@gmail.com
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
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The conversion to qnx6_get_folio() in commit b2aa61556fcf
("qnx6: Convert qnx6_get_page() to qnx6_get_folio()")
introduced a regression in directory iteration. The pointer 'de'
and the 'limit' address were calculated using byte offsets from
a char pointer without scaling by the size of a QNX6 directory
entry.
This causes the driver to read from incorrect memory offsets,
leading to "invalid direntry size" errors and premature
termination of directory scans.
Fix this by casting 'kaddr' to 'struct qnx6_dir_entry *' before
applying the offset and last_entry(...) increments. This allows the
compiler to correctly scale the pointer arithmetic by the 32-byte
stride of the directory entry structure.
Fixes: b2aa61556fcf ("qnx6: Convert qnx6_get_page() to qnx6_get_folio()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arpith Kalaginanavoor <arpithk@nvidia.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260526123858.1683035-1-arpithk@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
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atomic_create() in fs/namei.c drops the reference to the dentry
when it returns an error.
This behaviour was imported into dentry_create() so that it
will drop the reference if an error is returned from atomic_create(),
though not if vfs_create() returns an error (in the case where
->atomic_create is not supported).
The caller - nfsd4_create_file() - is made aware of this by checking
path->dentry, which will either be a counted reference to a dentry, or
an error pointer.
However the change to use start_creating()/end_creating() (which landed
shortly before the dentry_create() change landed, though was likely
developed around the same time) means that nfsd4_create_file() *needs* a
valid dentry so that it can unlock the parent.
The net result is that if NFSD exports a filesystem which uses
->atomic_create, and if a call to ->atomic_create returns an error, then
nfsd4_create_file() will pass an error pointer to end_creating()
and the parent will not be unlocked.
Fix this by changing dentry_create() to make sure path->dentry is always
a valid dentry, never an error-pointer. The actual error is already
returned a different way.
Note that if ->atomic_create() returns a different dentry (which may not
be possible in practice) we are guaranteed (because it is only ever
provided by d_spliace_alias()) that it will have the same d_parent and
so it will have the same effect when passed to end_creating().
Fixes: 64a989dbd144 ("VFS/knfsd: Teach dentry_create() to use atomic_open()")
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neil@brown.name>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/177969022571.3379282.16448744624428323496@noble.neil.brown.name
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@hammerspace.com>
Reviewed-by: Jori Koolstra <jkoolstra@xs4all.nl>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
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Fix three spelling errors in the comment for an internal file structure
allocation function:
- happend → happened
- over → exceed (grammatical fix)
- int → in
Changes since v1:
- Fix comma after e.g.
- Fix incorrect use of "imbalance"
Signed-off-by: Qingshuang Fu <fuqingshuang@kylinos.cn>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260527100025.960339-1-fffsqian@163.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
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bfs_dump_imap() allocates temporary buffer with get_zeroed_page().
kmalloc() is a better API for such use and it also provides better
scalability and more debugging possibilities.
Replace use of get_zeroed_page() with kzalloc().
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260523-b4-fs-v1-17-275e36a83f0e@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
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