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"git stash --staged" errors out when given binary files, after saving the
stash.
This behaviour dates back to the addition of the feature in 41a28eb6c1
(stash: implement '--staged' option for 'push' and 'save', 2021-10-18).
Adding the "--binary" option of "diff-tree" fixes this. The "diff-tree" call
in stash_patch() also omits "--binary", but that is fine since binary files
cannot be selected interactively.
Helped-By: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Helped-By: Randall S. Becker <randall.becker@nexbridge.ca>
Signed-off-by: Adam Johnson <me@adamj.eu>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Address some typos in the Git v2.45 changelog.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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The changelog entry for the new `git pack-refs --auto` mode only says
that the new flag is useful, but doesn't really say what it does. Add
some more information.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Signed-off-by: Orgad Shaneh <orgads@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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strbuf_addf() has been reporting a negative return value of vsnprintf(3)
as a bug since f141bd804d (Handle broken vsnprintf implementations in
strbuf, 2007-11-13). Other functions copied that behavior:
7b03c89ebd (add xsnprintf helper function, 2015-09-24)
5ef264dbdb (strbuf.c: add `strbuf_insertf()` and `strbuf_vinsertf()`, 2019-02-25)
8d25663d70 (mem-pool: add mem_pool_strfmt(), 2024-02-25)
However, vsnprintf(3) can legitimately return a negative value if the
formatted output would be longer than INT_MAX. Stop accusing it of
being broken and just report the fact that formatting failed.
Suggested-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: René Scharfe <l.s.r@web.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Signed-off-by: Alexander Shopov <ash@kambanaria.org>
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Signed-off-by: Jean-Noël Avila <jn.avila@free.fr>
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The previous team has not maintained the translation since 2.37. Leader
has agreed to transfer leadership to me.
Signed-off-by: Vũ Tiến Hưng <newcomerminecraft@gmail.com>
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Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Update contact address for Linus Arver.
* la/mailmap-entry:
mailmap: change primary address for Linus Arver
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Spellfix.
* pf/commitish-committish:
typo: replace 'commitish' with 'committish'
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Fix a bug that allows the "--rfc" and "-k" options to be specified together
when "git format-patch" is executed, which was introduced in the commit
e0d7db7423a9 ("format-patch: --rfc honors what --subject-prefix sets").
Add a couple of additional tests to t4014, to cover additional cases of
the mutual exclusivity between different "git format-patch" options.
Signed-off-by: Dragan Simic <dsimic@manjaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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* maint-2.43: (40 commits)
Git 2.43.4
Git 2.42.2
Git 2.41.1
Git 2.40.2
Git 2.39.4
fsck: warn about symlink pointing inside a gitdir
core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning
init.templateDir: consider this config setting protected
clone: prevent hooks from running during a clone
Add a helper function to compare file contents
init: refactor the template directory discovery into its own function
find_hook(): refactor the `STRIP_EXTENSION` logic
clone: when symbolic links collide with directories, keep the latter
entry: report more colliding paths
t5510: verify that D/F confusion cannot lead to an RCE
submodule: require the submodule path to contain directories only
clone_submodule: avoid using `access()` on directories
submodules: submodule paths must not contain symlinks
clone: prevent clashing git dirs when cloning submodule in parallel
t7423: add tests for symlinked submodule directories
...
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Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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* maint-2.42: (39 commits)
Git 2.42.2
Git 2.41.1
Git 2.40.2
Git 2.39.4
fsck: warn about symlink pointing inside a gitdir
core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning
init.templateDir: consider this config setting protected
clone: prevent hooks from running during a clone
Add a helper function to compare file contents
init: refactor the template directory discovery into its own function
find_hook(): refactor the `STRIP_EXTENSION` logic
clone: when symbolic links collide with directories, keep the latter
entry: report more colliding paths
t5510: verify that D/F confusion cannot lead to an RCE
submodule: require the submodule path to contain directories only
clone_submodule: avoid using `access()` on directories
submodules: submodule paths must not contain symlinks
clone: prevent clashing git dirs when cloning submodule in parallel
t7423: add tests for symlinked submodule directories
has_dir_name(): do not get confused by characters < '/'
...
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Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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* maint-2.41: (38 commits)
Git 2.41.1
Git 2.40.2
Git 2.39.4
fsck: warn about symlink pointing inside a gitdir
core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning
init.templateDir: consider this config setting protected
clone: prevent hooks from running during a clone
Add a helper function to compare file contents
init: refactor the template directory discovery into its own function
find_hook(): refactor the `STRIP_EXTENSION` logic
clone: when symbolic links collide with directories, keep the latter
entry: report more colliding paths
t5510: verify that D/F confusion cannot lead to an RCE
submodule: require the submodule path to contain directories only
clone_submodule: avoid using `access()` on directories
submodules: submodule paths must not contain symlinks
clone: prevent clashing git dirs when cloning submodule in parallel
t7423: add tests for symlinked submodule directories
has_dir_name(): do not get confused by characters < '/'
docs: document security issues around untrusted .git dirs
...
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Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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* maint-2.40: (39 commits)
Git 2.40.2
Git 2.39.4
fsck: warn about symlink pointing inside a gitdir
core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning
init.templateDir: consider this config setting protected
clone: prevent hooks from running during a clone
Add a helper function to compare file contents
init: refactor the template directory discovery into its own function
find_hook(): refactor the `STRIP_EXTENSION` logic
clone: when symbolic links collide with directories, keep the latter
entry: report more colliding paths
t5510: verify that D/F confusion cannot lead to an RCE
submodule: require the submodule path to contain directories only
clone_submodule: avoid using `access()` on directories
submodules: submodule paths must not contain symlinks
clone: prevent clashing git dirs when cloning submodule in parallel
t7423: add tests for symlinked submodule directories
has_dir_name(): do not get confused by characters < '/'
docs: document security issues around untrusted .git dirs
upload-pack: disable lazy-fetching by default
...
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Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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* maint-2.39: (38 commits)
Git 2.39.4
fsck: warn about symlink pointing inside a gitdir
core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning
init.templateDir: consider this config setting protected
clone: prevent hooks from running during a clone
Add a helper function to compare file contents
init: refactor the template directory discovery into its own function
find_hook(): refactor the `STRIP_EXTENSION` logic
clone: when symbolic links collide with directories, keep the latter
entry: report more colliding paths
t5510: verify that D/F confusion cannot lead to an RCE
submodule: require the submodule path to contain directories only
clone_submodule: avoid using `access()` on directories
submodules: submodule paths must not contain symlinks
clone: prevent clashing git dirs when cloning submodule in parallel
t7423: add tests for symlinked submodule directories
has_dir_name(): do not get confused by characters < '/'
docs: document security issues around untrusted .git dirs
upload-pack: disable lazy-fetching by default
fetch/clone: detect dubious ownership of local repositories
...
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Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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This topic addresses two CVEs:
- CVE-2024-32020:
Local clones may end up hardlinking files into the target repository's
object database when source and target repository reside on the same
disk. If the source repository is owned by a different user, then
those hardlinked files may be rewritten at any point in time by the
untrusted user.
- CVE-2024-32021:
When cloning a local source repository that contains symlinks via the
filesystem, Git may create hardlinks to arbitrary user-readable files
on the same filesystem as the target repository in the objects/
directory.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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This topic branch adds a couple of measures designed to make it much
harder to exploit any bugs in Git's recursive clone machinery that might
be found in the future.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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In the wake of fixing a vulnerability where `git clone` mistakenly
followed a symbolic link that it had just written while checking out
files, writing into a gitdir, let's add some defense-in-depth by
teaching `git fsck` to report symbolic links stored in its trees that
point inside `.git/`.
Even though the Git project never made any promises about the exact
shape of the `.git/` directory's contents, there are likely repositories
out there containing symbolic links that point inside the gitdir. For
that reason, let's only report these as warnings, not as errors.
Security-conscious users are encouraged to configure
`fsck.symlinkPointsToGitDir = error`.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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Quite frequently, when vulnerabilities were found in Git's (quite
complex) clone machinery, a relatively common way to escalate the
severity was to trick Git into running a hook which is actually a script
that has just been laid on disk as part of that clone. This constitutes
a Remote Code Execution vulnerability, the highest severity observed in
Git's vulnerabilities so far.
Some previously-fixed vulnerabilities allowed malicious repositories to
be crafted such that Git would check out files not in the worktree, but
in, say, a submodule's `<git>/hooks/` directory.
A vulnerability that "merely" allows to modify the Git config would
allow a related attack vector, to manipulate Git into looking in the
worktree for hooks, e.g. redirecting the location where Git looks for
hooks, via setting `core.hooksPath` (which would be classified as
CWE-427: Uncontrolled Search Path Element and CWE-114: Process Control,
for more details see https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/427.html and
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/114.html).
To prevent that attack vector, let's error out and complain loudly if an
active `core.hooksPath` configuration is seen in the repository-local
Git config during a `git clone`.
There is one caveat: This changes Git's behavior in a slightly
backwards-incompatible manner. While it is probably a rare scenario (if
it exists at all) to configure `core.hooksPath` via a config in the Git
templates, it _is_ conceivable that some valid setup requires this to
work. In the hopefully very unlikely case that a user runs into this,
there is an escape hatch: set the `GIT_CLONE_PROTECTION_ACTIVE=false`
environment variable. Obviously, this should be done only with utmost
caution.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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The ability to configuring the template directory is a delicate feature:
It allows defining hooks that will be run e.g. during a `git clone`
operation, such as the `post-checkout` hook.
As such, it is of utmost importance that Git would not allow that config
setting to be changed during a `git clone` by mistake, allowing an
attacker a chance for a Remote Code Execution, allowing attackers to run
arbitrary code on unsuspecting users' machines.
As a defense-in-depth measure, to prevent minor vulnerabilities in the
`git clone` code from ballooning into higher-serverity attack vectors,
let's make this a protected setting just like `safe.directory` and
friends, i.e. ignore any `init.templateDir` entries from any local
config.
Note: This does not change the behavior of any recursive clone (modulo
bugs), as the local repository config is not even supposed to be written
while cloning the superproject, except in one scenario: If a config
template is configured that sets the template directory. This might be
done because `git clone --recurse-submodules --template=<directory>`
does not pass that template directory on to the submodules'
initialization.
Another scenario where this commit changes behavior is where
repositories are _not_ cloned recursively, and then some (intentional,
benign) automation configures the template directory to be used before
initializing the submodules.
So the caveat is that this could theoretically break existing processes.
In both scenarios, there is a way out, though: configuring the template
directory via the environment variable `GIT_TEMPLATE_DIR`.
This change in behavior is a trade-off between security and
backwards-compatibility that is struck in favor of security.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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Critical security issues typically combine relatively common
vulnerabilities such as case confusion in file paths with other
weaknesses in order to raise the severity of the attack.
One such weakness that has haunted the Git project in many a
submodule-related CVE is that any hooks that are found are executed
during a clone operation. Examples are the `post-checkout` and
`fsmonitor` hooks.
However, Git's design calls for hooks to be disabled by default, as only
disabled example hooks are copied over from the templates in
`<prefix>/share/git-core/templates/`.
As a defense-in-depth measure, let's prevent those hooks from running.
Obviously, administrators can choose to drop enabled hooks into the
template directory, though, _and_ it is also possible to override
`core.hooksPath`, in which case the new check needs to be disabled.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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In the next commit, Git will learn to disallow hooks during `git clone`
operations _except_ when those hooks come from the templates (which are
inherently supposed to be trusted). To that end, we add a function to
compare the contents of two files.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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Signed-off-by: Linus Arver <linusa@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Signed-off-by: Linus Arver <linusa@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Signed-off-by: Linus Arver <linusa@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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No matter how well someone configures their email tooling, understanding
who to send the patches to is something that must always be considered.
So discuss it first instead of at the end.
In the following commit we will clean up the (now redundant) discussion
about sending security patches to the Git Security mailing list.
Signed-off-by: Linus Arver <linusa@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Signed-off-by: Linus Arver <linusa@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Signed-off-by: Linus Arver <linusa@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Use a dash ("git-contacts", not "git contacts") because the script is
not installed as part of "git" toolset. This also puts the script on
one line, which should make it easier to grep for with a loose search
query, such as
$ git grep git.contacts Documentation
Also add a footnote to describe where the script is located, to help
readers who may not be familiar with such "contrib" scripts (and how
they are not accessible with the usual "git <subcommand>" syntax).
Signed-off-by: Linus Arver <linusa@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Although we've had this script since 4d06402b1b (contrib: add
git-contacts helper, 2013-07-21), we don't mention it in our
introductory docs. Do so now.
Helped-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Arver <linusa@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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When rebasing with "--signoff" the commit created by "rebase --continue"
after resolving conflicts or editing a commit fails to add the
"Signed-off-by:" trailer. This happens because the message from the
original commit is reused instead of the one that would have been used
if the sequencer had not stopped for the user interaction. The correct
message is stored in ctx->message and so with a couple of exceptions
this is written to rebase_path_message() when stopping for user
interaction instead. The exceptions are (i) "fixup" and "squash"
commands where the file is written by error_failed_squash() and (ii)
"edit" commands that are fast-forwarded where the original message is
still reused. The latter is safe because "--signoff" will never
fast-forward.
Note this introduces a change in behavior as the message file now
contains conflict comments. This is safe because commit_staged_changes()
passes an explicit cleanup flag when not editing the message and when
the message is being edited it will be cleaned up automatically. This
means user now sees the same message comments in editor with "rebase
--continue" as they would if they ran "git commit" themselves before
continuing the rebase. It also matches the behavior of "git
cherry-pick", "git merge" etc. which all list the files with merge
conflicts.
The tests are extended to check that all commits made after continuing a
rebase have a "Signed-off-by:" trailer. Sadly there are a couple of
leaks in apply.c which I've not been able to track down that mean this
test file is no-longer leak free when testing "git rebase --apply
--signoff" with conflicts.
Reported-by: David Bimmler <david.bimmler@isovalent.com>
Signed-off-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood@dunelm.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Add an strbuf to "struct replay_ctx" to hold the current commit
message. This does not change the behavior but it will allow us to fix a
bug with "git rebase --signoff" in the next commit. A future patch
series will use the changes here to avoid writing the commit message to
disc unless there are conflicts or the commit is being reworded.
The changes in do_pick_commit() are a mechanical replacement of "msgbuf"
with "ctx->message". In do_merge() the code to write commit message to
disc is factored out of the conditional now that both branches store the
message in the same buffer.
Signed-off-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood@dunelm.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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The list of current fixups is an implementation detail of the sequencer
and so it should not be stored in the public options struct.
Signed-off-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood@dunelm.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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"struct replay_opts" has a number of fields that are for internal
use. While they are marked as private having them in a public struct is
a distraction for callers and means that every time the internal details
are changed we have to recompile all the files that include sequencer.h
even though the public API is unchanged. This commit starts the process
of removing the private fields by adding an opaque pointer to a "struct
replay_ctx" to "struct replay_opts" and moving the "reflog_message"
member to the new private struct.
The sequencer currently updates the state files on disc each time it
processes a command in the todo list. This is an artifact of the
scripted implementation and makes the code hard to reason about as it is
not possible to get a complete view of the state in memory. In the
future we will add new members to "struct replay_ctx" to remedy this and
avoid writing state to disc unless the sequencer stops for user
interaction.
Signed-off-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood@dunelm.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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sequencer_post_commit_cleanup() initializes an instance of "struct
replay_opts" but does not call replay_opts_release(). Currently this
does not leak memory because the code paths called don't allocate any of
the struct members. That will change in the next commit so add call to
replay_opts_release() to prevent a memory leak in "git commit" that
breaks all of the leak free tests.
Signed-off-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood@dunelm.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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* pw/t3428-cleanup:
t3428: restore coverage for "apply" backend
t3428: use test_commit_message
t3428: modernize test setup
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Now that we have dropped `the_index`, `initialize_the_repository()`
doesn't really do a lot anymore except for setting up the pointer for
`the_repository` and then calling `initialize_repository()`. The former
can be replaced by statically initializing the pointer though, which
basically makes this function moot.
Convert callers to instead call `initialize_repository(the_repository)`
and drop `initialize_thee_repository()`.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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All users of `the_index` have been converted to use either a custom
`struct index_state *` or the index provided by `the_repository`. We can
thus drop the globally-accessible declaration of this variable. In fact,
we can go further than that and drop `the_index` completely now and have
it be allocated dynamically in `initialize_repository()` as all the
other data structures in it are.
This concludes the quest to make Git `the_index` free, which has started
with 4aab5b46f4 (Make read-cache.c "the_index" free., 2007-04-01).
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Convert git-clone(1) to use `the_repository->index` instead of
`the_index`.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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When Git starts, one of the first things it will do is to call
`initialize_the_repository()`. This function sets up both the global
`the_repository` and `the_index` variables as required. Part of that
setup is also to set `the_repository.index = &the_index` so that the
index can be accessed via the repository.
When calling `repo_init()` on a repository though we set the complete
struct to all-zeroes, which will also cause us to unset the `index`
pointer. And as we don't re-initialize the index in that function, we
will end up with a `NULL` pointer here.
This has been fine until now becaues this function is only used to
create a new repository. git-init(1) does not access the index at all
after initializing the repository, whereas git-checkout(1) only uses
`the_index` directly. We are about to remove `the_index` though, which
will uncover this partially-initialized repository structure.
Refactor the code and create a common `initialize_repository()` function
that gets called from `repo_init()` and `initialize_the_repository()`.
This function sets up both the repository and the index as required.
Like this, we can easily special-case when `repo_init()` gets called
with `the_repository`.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Convert builtins to use `the_repository->index` instead of `the_index`.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Convert test-helper tools to use `the_repository->index` instead of
`the_index`.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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